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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 This matter is before the court following entry of our 
order on November 30, 1993, granting defendant-appellant Kerr-
McGee Chemical Corporation permission to appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b).  We will reverse the order of the district 
court denying Kerr-McGee's motion for summary judgment entered on 
September 8, 1993, and we will remand the matter to the district 
court for entry of a summary judgment in its favor. 
 The facts are largely not in dispute, and, in any 
event, we accept the allegations of the plaintiffs-appellees 
Elaine Leo and Linda Yoder for purposes of this appeal.  From 
prior to the turn of the 20th century continuing until 1940, the 
Welsbach Incandescent Light Company maintained and operated a 
factory in Gloucester City, New Jersey, for manufacturing 
 
 
incandescent gas mantles, a process involving extracting thorium 
from monazite ores.  This process generated toxic wastes 
consisting of thorium by-products which Welsbach deposited on the 
factory site, thus contaminating the surrounding land.  In 1940, 
Welsbach's Illinois-based competitor, Lindsay Light and Chemical 
Company, purchased Welsbach's gas mantle business.  In the sale, 
Lindsay acquired Welsbach's outstanding orders, records, 
formulas, raw materials, inventory, customer lists, gas mantle 
production line, and the right to use the "Welsbach" name.  
However, Lindsay did not acquire the Gloucester City land and 
factory.  Rather, it moved the gas mantle business to its own 
plant in Illinois.   
 Following a series of acquisitions, Kerr-McGee acquired 
Lindsay, and it thus concedes that in this litigation it stands 
in Lindsay's shoes.  Accordingly, we will refer to Lindsay and 
Kerr-McGee simply as Kerr-McGee.  Welsbach owned a second line of 
business which it sold to Rheem Manufacturing Company but Rheem's 
successors, though originally defendants in this action, have 
been dismissed from the case.  Welsbach was dissolved in 1944. 
 In 1961, Leo and Yoder, who are sisters, and their 
parents, Thomas and Catherine Bekes, moved to a home close to the 
former site of the Welsbach factory in Gloucester City, though 
Leo and Yoder now live elsewhere.  On December 5, 1988, Thomas 
Bekes died from bladder cancer.  In March 1991, the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection notified Catherine Bekes 
of the high levels of gamma radiation and thorium on her property 
and on June 3, 1991, the New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund 
 
 
acquired her residence, forcing her to relocate.  Soon thereafter 
she also died from bladder cancer.  Leo and Yoder allege that 
their parents contracted their bladder cancer from exposure to 
thorium and other waste substances deposited on the Welsbach 
land.   
 On January 29, 1993, Leo and Yoder filed suit, 
individually, and on behalf of their parents' estates, in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey against Kerr-McGee and certain other 
defendants to recover for death, injuries, and the potential risk 
of cancer arising from their exposure to thorium and other waste 
substances generated in the Welsbach gas mantle operation and 
deposited on the Gloucester City property.  As germane here, Leo 
and Yoder seek to impose liability on Kerr-McGee on a theory of 
strict liability.1  While Leo and Yoder do not claim that Kerr-
McGee itself generated the waste which caused the deaths and 
injuries, they assert that it is liable by reason of its 
acquisition of Welsbach's gas mantle business.  On March 4, 1993, 
one of the other defendants removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey on the basis of 
diversity of citizenship. 
 Subsequently, Kerr-McGee filed a motion to dismiss 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint 
did not state a claim on which relief may be granted inasmuch as 
                     
1.  Leo and Yoder also set forth theories of liability predicated 
on negligence and breach of warranty but we do not discuss them 
as we find no support for liability on either theory and they do 




Kerr-McGee never has owned the Gloucester City land and factory.  
In its bench opinion the district court treated the motion as a 
motion for summary judgment because it considered material other 
than the complaint submitted on the motion.  The court then 
predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would extend the 
product line doctrine of successor corporate liability, as 
explicated in Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 
1981), to the toxic tort at issue, because the toxic by-products 
were generated directly from the manufacturing of Welsbach's gas 
mantles.2  Thus, the court denied Kerr-McGee's motion by the 
order of September 8, 1993.  Kerr-McGee then moved for an 
amendment of the order to allow an interlocutory appeal, and the 
district court granted the amendment by an order entered on 
November 1, 1993.  We then granted Kerr-McGee leave to appeal. 
 
 II.  DISCUSSION 
 We exercise plenary review as the appeal presents an 
issue of law.  Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 
                     
2.  The court also relied on Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 431 
A.2d 826 (N.J. 1981), decided on the same day as Ramirez.  We, 
however, have no need to discuss Nieves at length as it merely 
held that an intermediate successor corporation could be liable 
under Ramirez even though there is a later viable successor 
corporation in existence.  We note that actions similar to the 
one in this case are sometimes called "environmental torts" and 
sometimes called "toxic torts."  As a matter of convenience, we 
use the latter term as the Supreme Court of New Jersey used that 
term in T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 
1251 (N.J. 1991).  Labels, however, are not significant, as we 
are concerned with the circumstances leading to the attempt to 
impose liability on Kerr-McGee rather than the characterization 
of the claim. 
 
 
762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).  Furthermore, we will apply New 
Jersey law as the parties agree that it is applicable.  Thus, we 
undertake to predict how the Supreme Court of New Jersey would 
resolve the issues in this case.  J & R Ice Cream Corp. v. 
California Smoothie Licensing Corp., No. 93-5516, slip op. at 19-
21 (3d Cir. Aug. 4, 1994). 
 We start, of course, with Ramirez, 431 A.2d 811, in  
which the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that: 
 where one corporation acquires all or 
substantially all the manufacturing assets of 
another corporation, even if exclusively for 
cash, and undertakes essentially the same 
manufacturing operation as the selling 
corporation, the purchasing corporation is 
strictly liable for the injuries caused by 
defects in the units of the same product 
line, even if previously manufactured and 
distributed by the selling corporation or its 
predecessor. 
 
431 A.2d at 825.  As the district court acknowledged, Ramirez is 
distinguishable from this case.  Unlike the injuries in Ramirez, 
the injuries of Leo, Yoder, and their parents were not caused by 
a unit in the product line manufactured first by Welsbach and 
then by Kerr-McGee.  Instead the injuries in this case were 
caused by conditions created by Welsbach's operations on land 
which Welsbach retained at the time of the sale of the gas mantle 
business to Kerr-McGee and on which Kerr-McGee never conducted 
any manufacturing activities.  Therefore, we must determine 
whether in light of these distinctions from Ramirez, the New 
 
 
Jersey Supreme Court nevertheless would apply the result in 
Ramirez to this case.3 
 The Ramirez court predicated its conclusion that the 
successor corporation could be liable for injuries caused by its 
predecessor's defective product on three rationales:  (1) the 
sale of the enterprise virtually destroyed the injured party's 
remedy against the original manufacturer; (2) the successor has 
the ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading 
role; and (3) it is fair to require the successor to assume a 
responsibility for defective products as that responsibility was 
a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's good 
will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of 
the business.  Id. at 820.  Clearly these rationales do not 
support the extension of successor liability to Kerr McGee in  
this case. 
 The first factor, the destruction of the injured 
party's remedy is a necessary but not a sufficient basis on which 
to place liability on the successor.4  Accordingly, if the 
                     
3.  A corporate successor can be liable for its predecessor's 
debts on theories other than that recognized in Ramirez.  For 
example, liability can be imposed on the successor if it assumes 
the predecessor's liabilities or if the predecessor merges into 
the successor.  Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 815.  But we confine our 
opinion to the question of whether Kerr-McGee may be liable based 
on the product-line doctrine of successor liability as that is 
the only basis for liability that Leo and Yoder advance against 
Kerr-McGee. 
4.  Actually, we are not certain that Leo and Yoder effectively 
do not have a remedy against Welsbach as they have named U.G.I., 
formerly known as United Gas Improvement Company, as a defendant 
on a theory that United Gas dominated Welsbach and therefore 
U.G.I. is "legally responsible for the obligations of Welsbach."  
 
 
selling corporation remains a viable entity able to respond in 
damages to the injured party, a successor acquiring a product 
line will not be liable for injuries caused by the predecessor's 
product after the product's sale as in that circumstance there 
would be no reason to impose successor liability.  Lapollo v. 
General Elec. Co., 664 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1987) (applying New 
Jersey law after Ramirez).  This initial rationale for the 
product-line doctrine of successor liability merely focuses on 
the need for imposition of successor liability rather than 
whether it is fair to impose it.  Therefore, we will not hold 
that proof that Leo and Yoder cannot recover against Welsbach 
because it has been dissolved is in itself a sufficient basis for 
the imposition of successor liability on Kerr-McGee. 
 The second rationale on which the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey based its result in Ramirez was the successor's ability to 
assume the predecessor corporation's risk-spreading role.  We 
think that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would recognize that 
Kerr-McGee does not have the capacity to assume Welsbach's risk-
spreading role.  In this regard, we point out that if successor 
liability can be imposed for a toxic tort arising from the 
predecessor's operations at a facility which the successor never 
acquires or controls, a prudent manufacturer acquiring a product 
line would make an analysis of environmental risks associated 
with the seller's facilities similar to that now undertaken by 
(..continued) 
However, Kerr-McGee has briefed the case on the assumption that 
Leo and Yoder do not have a remedy against Welsbach, and thus we 
decide the case on that basis. 
 
 
purchasers of real estate.  The purchaser then would attempt to 
acquire insurance for possible liabilities associated with the 
seller's real estate.   
 The impediment to commercial transactions from such a 
process is evident.  Indeed, inasmuch as a manufacturer might 
build a product or its component parts at more than one facility, 
a purchaser of a product line might face daunting obstacles in 
attempting to assess its risks of successor toxic tort liability 
for conditions on property to be retained by the seller of the 
product line.  Furthermore, a product-line purchaser not 
acquiring its predecessor's manufacturing facility probably would 
not be able to lessen the risks of toxic tort liability 
associated with the real estate.  It is doubtful that such a 
product-line purchaser would be able to undertake cleanup 
operations on land it did not own.  Moreover, the product-line 
purchaser might be unwilling to undertake such potentially costly 
projects.5  It seems clear, therefore, that if Ramirez applies 
here, a purchaser of a product line will be subject to 
liabilities for toxic torts of unpredictable scope for an 
indefinite period.  Overall, we cannot conceive that the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey would believe that the purchaser of a product 
line not acquiring the real estate at which the product was 
                     
5.  In FMC Corp v. United States Dep't of Commerce, No. 92-1945, 
slip op. at 11 (3d Cir. July 5, 1994) (in banc), the government 
estimated the cost of environmental cleanup of the facility 




manufactured reasonably could assume its predecessor's risk 
spreading role for toxic torts.6   
 In contrast, a successor to a product line may be able 
to take steps to reduce its risk of liability for injuries caused 
by the predecessor's products through recall and educational 
programs which include those products.  Furthermore, successor 
liability for injuries caused by units manufactured by the 
predecessor, at least when compared to potential toxic tort 
liability, is a discrete manageable matter.  First, the successor 
may be able reasonably to anticipate the risks associated with a 
product it is acquiring.  Second, product-line successor 
liability is applied in cases of the production of personal 
property.  Inasmuch as such property is not likely to have an 
indefinite useful life, passage of time will diminish the chance 
of liability being imposed on the successor. 
 This constant diminution of exposure to product 
liability is enhanced by the rule followed in New Jersey and 
elsewhere that a manufacturer cannot be strictly liable unless 
there was a defect in the product when it left the manufacturer's 
control.  Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 326 A.2d 673, 677 
(N.J. 1974).  It seems apparent that, except perhaps in design 
defect cases, a defect in a product when the manufacturer 
distributed the product is likely to manifest itself and cause 
                     
6.  In Ramirez the Supreme Court of New Jersey acknowledged that 
the negative effect of successor liability in a product liability 
case on the sale of manufacturing assets was a "legitimate" 
concern.  431 A.2d at 822.  Thus, we think it appropriate for us 
to consider that effect. 
 
 
injury within a reasonable time after the product is 
manufactured.  Accordingly, as a practical matter, successor 
liability under Ramirez is likely to be imposed in most cases, if 
at all, for a limited period.7  Furthermore, if there is an 
injury from a product a long time after it leaves the 
manufacturer's hands, the injured plaintiff may have difficulty 
establishing that the defect existed in the product when 
manufactured and originally distributed.  Thus, using the time 
scenario here, it would be unusual for the successor in a product 
line case to be defending an action in the 1990's for a product 
that could have been built at the latest in 1940.   
 On the other hand toxic tort liability can be imposed 
for activities in the distant past.  See T & E Indus., Inc. v. 
Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991).8  This tail on 
potential toxic tort liability following the disposal of chemical 
wastes is attributable to the fact that the toxic wastes may 
remain in the ground for long periods, thus exposing persons and 
property to injury long after manufacturing has ended.  Indeed, 
this case demonstrates how long the successor can face claims for 
toxic torts.  Furthermore, the difficulty that the purchaser of a 
product line will have in assessing its risk of liability for 
                     
7.  Of course, the length of the period depends on the type of 
product involved.  For example, machinery might last longer than 
automobiles. 
8.  We recognize that T & E Indus. is not a personal injury case.  
Nevertheless we cite the case to demonstrate how it is possible 




toxic torts as compared to its risk of successor product 
liability is further heightened by the fact that whereas injuries 
from defective products are likely to be traumatic, and thus be 
immediately obvious, injury from exposure to toxic wastes may 
develop over an extended period.  We also observe that it would 
be more likely that the successor could acquire insurance 
coverage for the discrete risks flowing from injuries caused 
directly by a predecessor's product than for environmental risks 
from conditions on real estate. 
 The third Ramirez rationale, that it is fair to require 
a successor to assume a responsibility for defective products as 
that responsibility is a burden necessarily attached to the 
successor's acquisition of the predecessor's good will, has no 
application in this case.  The good will that Kerr-McGee acquired 
from Welsbach was attached to the product line it acquired, gas 
mantles, rather than to the site at which Welsbach manufactured 
the product.  Thus, Leo and Yoder do not assert that this is a 
case in which Welsbach and Kerr-McGee encouraged the purchasers 
of the gas mantles to associate them with their geographical 
source, as, e.g., "a genuine widget manufactured in the widget 
center of the world."  Consequently, while Leo and Yoder point 
out that Kerr-McGee's purchase of the Welsbach gas mantle product 
line was profitable, and they attribute that profit in part to 
the good will it acquired from Welsbach, that point is 
immaterial.       
 
 
 In reaching our result, we quite naturally consider our 
opinion in City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 994 
F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993).  There we indicated that while:   
 [a] federal court may act as a judicial 
pioneer when interpreting the United States 
Constitution and federal law . . . [i]n a 
diversity case . . . federal courts may not 
engage in judicial activism.  Federalism 
concerns require that we permit state courts 
to decide whether and to what extent they 
will expand state common law . . . .  Our 
role is to apply the current law of the 
jurisdiction, and leave it undisturbed.   
 
Id. at 123 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  We could 
allow liability to be imposed in this case on Kerr-McGee only if 
we stretched Ramirez far beyond its original scope and, in light 
of City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., we will not 
do that.  While the district court believed that this case could 
come within the Ramirez holding, in large part it reached that 
conclusion because of what it thought was "the traditional New 
Jersey view that if you are injured somebody ought to be liable 
for it."  But we reject that approach.  While we might be willing 
to apply the precedents of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
circumstances somewhat beyond the limits of liability that court 
has recognized in extant cases, we will not apply Ramirez in the 
circumstances here, which are far beyond the limits of that case. 
 In closing, we note that the parties in their briefs 
discuss cases involving liability of successors acquiring 
contaminated property and other cases involving liabilities 
arising from the ownership of and activities on real estate.  
See, e.g., T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 
 
 
1249; State of New Jersey, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron 
Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).  We have examined these cases 
but do not discuss them, as they have only the most tangential 
relationship to this case in light of the fact that Kerr-McGee 
never owned, controlled or engaged in activities on the 
Gloucester City property. 
 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 We will reverse the order of September 8, 1993, and 
will remand the matter to the district court for entry of a 





 ELAINE LEO, ET AL. V. KERR-MC GEE CHEMICAL CORP., ET AL., NO. 93-5730 
 
ATKINS, Senior District Judge, specially concurring: 
 While the record does not reflect the fact, this judge 
takes judicial notice of the procedure, adopted by 44 of the 
Supreme Courts or comparable final state appellate courts, 
permitting federal appellate courts to submit questions for 
resolution by such courts, involving state common law issues that 
remain "open."  Such procedure cries out for decision in the 
appeal sub judice.  The issue concerns, as the majority opinion 
so clearly demonstrates, whether this court should hold an entity 
liable for environmental degradation of land for commercial 
engrandizement after it obviously profited from such degradation, 
even though acquisition of land was not part of the product line 
purchase.  This salutary certification procedure avoids the 
charge, admittedly valid, that the federal courts should avoid 
extending, gratuitously, the common law of the states within the 
ambit of their jurisdiction.  City of Philadelphia v. Lead 
Industries Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 Here, we are called upon to decide what, under a new 
set of facts, the Supreme Court of New Jersey would decide in an 
issue it has never been called upon to consider.  Our problem is 
complicated by New Jersey's failure to provide a certification 
procedure permitting it to have a needed and proper voice in the 
development of the common law of its state. 
 
 
 A. The Development of New Jersey's "Product Line" 
Doctrine 
 When the district court denied the plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, it relied on a string of cases defining the 
present "product line" theory of successor corporation liability 
for strict liability torts.  From the trend formed by these 
opinions, the district court "predicted" how the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would rule under the present factual circumstances.  
The district court held that the product line doctrine of 
successor liability originally adopted in Ramirez v. Amsted 
Industries, Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981), should be applied to 
include circumstances where a predecessor corporation improperly 
disposed of toxic manufacturing by-products on its factory site 
and then sold its entire product line patented process, good 
will, inventory, sales records and trade name, but not the 
factory site itself, to a successor corporation which continues 
the same manufacturing process at different site.  Upon review of 
the line of cases dealing with the "product line" theory of 
successor corporate liability in products liability cases, I 
believe that the district court was correct in determining that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court would apply the strict liability 
doctrine to a strict liability environmental tort under these 
factual circumstances. 
 B. Analysis 
 This is not a case where the corporate successor 
purchases some of the land that the predecessor contaminated and 
then continued a separate business on that land.  Therefore, 
 
 
State Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corp., 376 A.2d 
1339 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977), is distinguishable.  This 
case is, however, more like Ramirez, supra, in that Welsbach's 
product line could be considered as all or substantially all of 
the manufacturing assets which were acquired by Kerr-McGee's 
predecessors.  Thus, even if the assets were acquired exclusively 
for cash, and Kerr-McGee and its predecessors undertook 
essentially the same manufacturing operation as Welsbach, Kerr-
McGee should be strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in 
units or by waste from production of those units of the same 
product line, even if previously manufactured and distributed by 
Welsbach.  See Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 825. 
 The policies in Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d (Ca. 1977), 
and Ramirez, supra, apply similarly to the present case.  First 
the plaintiff's potential remedy against Welsbach, the original 
manufacturer who caused the contamination, was destroyed by the 
Kerr-McGee's purchase of Welsbach's assets, trade name, good will 
and Welsbach's resulting dissolution.  In other words, Kerr-
McGee's acquisition destroyed whatever remedy plaintiff might 
have had against Welsbach.  Second, the imposition of successor 
corporation liability upon Kerr-McGee is consistent with the 
public policy of spreading the risk to society at large for the 
costs of injuries from contamination due to a product line.  This 
is because the successor corporation is in a better position to 
bear accident-avoidance costs.  In this case, Kerr-McGee is in a 
better position to bear the costs because Welsbach transferred to 
Kerr-McGee the resource that had previously been available to 
 
 
Welsbach for meeting its responsibilities to persons injured by 
the product line it operated.  Third, the imposition upon Kerr-
McGee of responsibility to answer claims of liability for 
injuries allegedly caused by Welsbach's product line is justified 
as a burden necessarily attached to its enjoyment of Welsbach's 
trade name, good will and the continuation of an established 
manufacturing enterprise.  For "[p]ublic policy requires that 
having received the substantial benefits of the continuing 
manufacturing enterprise, the successor corporation should also 
be made to bear the burden of the operating costs that other 
established business operations must ordinarily bear."  Ramirez, 
431 A.2d at 822.  "[I]n light of the social policy underlying the 
law of products liability, the true worth of a predecessor 
corporation must reflect the potential liability that the 
shareholders have escaped through the sale of their corporation."  
Id.  To avoid such liability Kerr-McGee could have "obtain[ed] 
products liability insurance for contingent liability claims, and 
it [could have entered] into full or partial indemnification or 
escrow agreements with the selling corporation."  Id. at 823; see 
La Pollo v. General Electric Co., 664 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1987). 
 Kerr-McGee, like Bruno in Nieves v. Bruno Sherman 
Corp., 431 A.2d 826 (N.J. 1981), was able "to gauge the risks of 
injury from defects in the [Welsbach] product line and to bear 
the accident-avoidance costs, "since Kerr-McGee was intimately 
familiar with the production of gas mantles and the unavoidable 
thorium manufacturing waste.  Id. at 830.  Evidence to support 
this conclusion is found by Lindsay's acquisition of all the 
 
 
assets and sources of information related to the Welsbach product 
line.  The liability also should apply to Kerr-McGee because 
Kerr-McGee's "acquisition of the business assets and 
manufacturing operation of [Welsbach] contributed to the 
destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the original 
manufacturer" - Welsbach.  Id. at 831.  Finally, like State Dept. 
of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 
1983), I believe that this Court should follow the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's application of strict liability in environmental 
torts, see Department of Transportation v. PSC Resources, Inc., 
419 A.2d 1151 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), and apply product 
line strict liability to this environmental tort. 
 The district court in this case "predicted" that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would apply the Ramirez successor 
corporation strict liability product line doctrine to strict 
liability environmental actions.  Since this is an issue of first 
impression in New Jersey, the district court truly was 
"predicting" the result.  Hence, if permitted to prognosticate, I 
too would hold that the New Jersey Supreme Court would apply the 
doctrine of strict liability to this environmental case and thus 
affirm the district court.  However, while I believe that the 
decision to apply the doctrine to environmental cases should be 
left in the hands or the highest state court, there is no method 
to certify such a question to the court. 
 C. The Restraint of City of Philadelphia 
 Despite my firm conviction that the district court 
should be affirmed, I am constrained by the philosophical tenet 
 
 
of this court in City of Philadelphia, supra, which I respect and 
adopt.  We are not appointed to be activists but to interpret and 
apply the law as we see it.  However, I believe that a dangerous 
precedent will be set if this court continues down the path which 
prohibits direct application of state doctrines.  Primarily, the 
removal and jurisdictional statutes will be used as a sword to 
prevent final resolution of a state claim.  For example, where a 
defendant realizes that the state's highest court has not ruled 
on their specific factual circumstance, but has developed a 
doctrine that might be adverse to that defendant, then the 
defendant will most assuredly remove the case to federal court 
knowing that, on appeal, the circuit court will grant summary 
judgment in their favor based on City of Philadelphia.  The 
result will create an atmosphere where state rights will never be 
vindicated and cases will not proceed to their ultimate 
conclusion. 
 Accordingly and reluctantly, I join the majority 
remanding this matter to the district court for entry of a 
summary judgment in favor of Kerr-McGee. 
 
